Beyond aid : new sources and innovative mechanisms for financing development in Sub-Saharan Africa by Ratha, Dilip et al.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4609
Beyond Aid: 
New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing 
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4609
Given Sub-Saharan Africa’s enormous resource needs 
for growth, poverty reduction, and other Millennium 
Development Goals, the development community has 
little choice but to continue to explore new sources of 
financing, innovative private-to-private sector solutions, 
and public-private partnerships to mobilize additional 
international financing. The paper suggests several new 
instruments for improving access to capital. An analysis 
of country creditworthiness suggests that many countries 
in the region may be more creditworthy than previously 
believed. Establishing sovereign rating benchmarks and 
credit enhancement through guarantee instruments 
provided by multilateral aid agencies would facilitate 
This paper—a product of the Migration and Remittances Team of the Development Prospects Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to analyze innovative instruments that developing countries can utilize for mobilizing development 
financing. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at dratha@worldbank.org.  
market access. Creative financial structuring, such as 
the International Financing Facility for Immunization, 
would help front-load aid commitments, although 
these may not result in additional financing in the long 
run. Preliminary estimates suggest that Sub-Saharan 
African countries can potentially raise $1-3 billion by 
reducing the cost of international migrant remittances, 
$5-10 billion by issuing diaspora bonds, and $17 billion 
by securitizing future remittances and other future 
receivables. African countries that have recently received 
debt relief however need to be cautious when resorting to 
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Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for 
Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
Official aid alone will not be adequate for funding efforts to accelerate economic growth 
and poverty alleviation and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa. Ultimately 
the private sector will need to be the engine of growth and employment generation, and official 
aid efforts must catalyze innovative financing solutions for the private sector. It is important to 
stress that financing MDGs would require increasing the investment rate above the domestic 
saving rate, and bridging the financing gap with additional financing from abroad.
1  
This paper examines the level and composition of resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa: 
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio debt and equity flows, bank lending, official aid flows, 
capital flight, and personal and institutional remittances. Recognizing that South Africa is 
expectedly the largest economy and the most dominant destination of private flows, the analysis 
focuses on the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa wherever appropriate.
2 The paper then examines some 
new or overlooked sources of financing such as diaspora bonds and remittances, and some 
innovative mechanisms such as future-flow securitization and partial guarantees provided by 
multilateral agencies, for raising additional, cross-border financing in the private sector. In 
passing, the paper also briefly discusses recent initiatives, such as the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and the International Financing Facility for Immunization 
(IFFIm), that use innovative methods to front-load future financing commitments from bilateral 
donors in order to introduce more predictability in aid flows.
3  
Resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased since 2000, a welcome reversal of 
the declining or flat trend seen during the 1990s. Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the 
region excluding South Africa has increased from $11.7 billion in 2000 to $37.5 billion in 2006; 
                                                 
1 Local borrowing by one investor would lower the availability of capital for another borrower, a point often 
overlooked in the literature.  
2 From 2000 to 2005, almost all portfolio flows went to South Africa. In contrast, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
received the bulk of official development assistance and remittances. 
3 Some of the other initiatives under consideration, although in a more preliminary form, include an international 
airline tax and a levy on international currency transactions (see discussions of Second and Third Plenary Meetings 
of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development [http://www.innovativefinance-oslo.no and 
http://www.innovativefinance.go.kr]). See also Kaul and Le Goulven (2003), Technical Group on Innovative 
Financing Mechanisms (2004), and United Nations (2006).  
  2FDI increased from $5.8 billion to an estimated $17.2 billion in 2006;
4 while net private bond 
and bank lending flows decreased from $-0.7 billion to an estimated $-2.5 billion during the 
same period.
5 Capital outflows from the region have also started reversing in recent years. 
Workers remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled from $4.6 billion in 2000 to 
$10.3 billion in 2006; and institutional remittances increased from $2.9 billion in 2000 to $6.3 
billion in 2006. New donors and investors (for example, China and India) have increased their 
presence in the region.  
The picture is less rosy, however, when Sub-Saharan Africa is compared with the other 
developing regions. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to depend on official aid for its external 
financing needs. In 2006, ODA was more than two-and-a-half times the size of private flows 
received by Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. The recent increase in ODA appears to 
be driven by debt relief provided through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (IBRD 2007).
6 According to IBRD (2007), debt relief 
represented close to 70 percent of the increase in bilateral official development assistance (ODA) 
to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2005. The relatively small FDI flows to the region 
went mostly to enclave investments in oil-exporting countries.
7 Portfolio bond and equity flows 
were almost non-existent outside South Africa. Private debt flows were small and predominantly 
relationship-based commercial bank lending,
8 and even these flows were mostly short-term in 
tenor. Less than half the countries in the region have a sovereign rating from the major credit 
rating agencies. Of those that are rated, most have below-investment grade ratings. Capital 
outflows appear to be smaller than in the previous decade, but the stock of flight capital from the 
region remains high. Migrant remittances appear to be increasing, but much of the flows are 
believed to be unrecorded as they bypass formal financial channels. In short, there is little room 
for complacency; efforts to explore new sources and innovative mechanisms for financing 
development in the region must continue. 
The paper suggests several new instruments for improving access to capital of Sub-
Saharan African countries. The analysis of country creditworthiness suggests that many countries 
                                                 
4 Although the amount received by Sub-Saharan Africa is tiny compared with the total FDI flows to developing 
countries, as a share of GDP it is equivalent to 2.4 percent, comparable to the share of FDI in the GDP of other 
developing regions. 
5 There is a reporting lag in the transfer items of the balance of payments statistics. Data on official debt flows were 
unavailable for 2006 as of March 2008. 
6 Aid effectiveness is hampered by coordination difficulties among donors and by a lack of absorptive capacity 
among borrowers in the region (see Gelb, Ramachandran, and Turner 2006; IBRD 2006; World Bank 2006). 
7 Oil exporters in Sub-Saharan Africa comprise nine low- and middle-income countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan) with a 
combined gross domestic product of $255 billion or 37 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product in 
2006.    
8 Only one middle-income oil-exporting Sub-Saharan African country, Angola, accounted for virtually all of net 
bank lending to Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa from 2003 to 2005. More recent data on 
syndicated loans suggests that bank lending has grown since, but mainly in resource rich countries such as Angola, 
Liberia, Nigeria  and Zambia.       
  3in the region appear to be more creditworthy than previously believed. Establishing sovereign 
rating benchmarks and credit enhancement through guarantee instruments provided by 
multilateral aid agencies would facilitate market access. Creative financial structuring, such as 
the IFFIm, can help front-load aid commitments, although they may not result in additional 
financing in the long run. Preliminary estimates suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries can 
potentially raise $1 billion to 3 billion by reducing the cost of international migrant remittances, 
$5 billion to 10 billion by issuing diaspora bonds, and $17 billion by securitizing future 
remittances and other future receivables.  
African countries, however, need to be cautious when resorting to market-based debt. It is 
essential that the borrowing space created by debt relief is used prudently, and not used to 
borrow excessively at commercial terms (IBRD 2007). “Free riding” by commercial and bilateral 
creditors can even lead to another round of excessive accumulation of debt.
9 Countries should 
also monitor and manage short-term external debt (especially those intermediated by domestic 
banks) to avoid currency and maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and potential 
liquidity crisis (Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha 2000). Short-term capital flows can reverse rapidly 
with potentially destabilizing effects on the financial markets.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following section analyzes trends in resource 
flows to Sub-Saharan Africa relative to other developing regions. The next section highlights 
some new sources and innovative mechanisms for development financing in the region. And the 
final section concludes with a summary of findings and some recommendations for the way 
forward. 
 
2. Trends in Financial Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa  
Resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have risen in recent years, but the region’s external 
finances are less diversified than in the other developing regions 
In one of the largest expansions in private capital flows to developing countries in recent 
decades, private medium and long-term capital flows nearly tripled in size from $195 billion in 
2000 to $670 billion in 2006. This period also saw significant diversification in the composition 
of private flows to developing countries (for FDI, portfolio bond and equity flows, bank lending, 
and derivative instruments). Official development assistance nearly doubled from $54 billion to 
$104 billion, as did migrant remittances, from $85 billion in 2000 to $221 billion in 2006.   
Official aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa also rose, from $12.2 billion in 2000 to $38.2 
billion (or 37 percent of ODA to developing countries) in 2006. Private resource flows to Sub-
Saharan Africa (other than FDI), however, have risen at a slower pace compared to other 
                                                 
9 “Free riding” implies that new lenders might extend credit to risky borrowers taking advantage of the improvement 
in the latter’s credit risk following debt relief and concessional loans by official creditors (IBRD 2007). 
  4developing regions, and the region’s share of private capital flows to developing regions has 
continued to remain small and undiversified (table 1).  
Table 1: Financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries, 2006 




2000-06 ( %) 
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa 
  Official  flows         
 ODA 
1/  17.0 17.4 11.7 30.1  37.5  220% 
 Official debt   4.3  3.5   0.7  -0.7  -2.5  .. 
 Private medium and long-
term flows  0.8 3.9 5.1  12.4  14.8  189% 
  FDI  1.3 3.3 5.8  10.8  17.2  197% 
  Portfolio  equity  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2  0.1  .. 
  Bond  0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0  -1.4  .. 
  Bank  lending  -0.5 0.3 -0.5 1.4  -1.1  .. 
 Private short-term debt  2.3  1.1  -1.4  1.0  4.6  .. 
 Migrants' remittances 
2/    1.7 3.1 4.3 8.7  9.6  124% 
  Institutional  remittances    1.4 2.3 2.9 5.4  6.2  117%. 
  Capital  Outflows  3.2 5.3 6.3 7.5  3.6  .. 
South Africa          
  Official flows             
  ODA 
1/ 0.0  0.4  0.5  0.7 0.7 47% 
  Official debt   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 0.0  .. 
 Private medium and long- 
term flows  0.3  4.0  6.2  17.4 16.1 160% 
 FDI  -0.1  1.2  1.0  6.5 -0.1  .. 
 Portfolio equity  0.4  2.9  4.2  7.2 15.0 257% 
 Bond   0.0  0.7  1.2  1.3 1.6 32% 
 Bank lending   0.0  -0.8  -0.2  2.4 -0.4  .. 
 Private short-term debt   0.0  1.9  0.3  1.8 5.6  1940% 
 Migrants' remittances 
2/ 0.1  0.1  0.3  0.7 0.7 114% 
 Institutional remittances   0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1 0.1  .. 
 Capital Outflows  0.2  4.1  3.3  2.5 10.5 214% 
Other developing regions          
  Official flows             
  ODA 
1/  37.3 41.0 41.5 76.1  65.7 58% 
  Official debt   19.8  35.4  -6.6  -69.9  -13.8  .. 
 Private medium and long- 
term  flows  30.9  158.9 183.3 465.5  639.2 249% 
 Private short-term debt  11.5 54.1 -5.3 86.8  84.1  .. 
 Migrants' remittances 
2/    29.2 54.3 79.9  181.9  211.0  164% 
  Institutional  remittances    15.7 14.0 26.9 58.1  63.0  134% 
 Capital outflows   34.6  79.9  163.3  364.7  545.4  234% 
1/ / Development Assistance Committee donors only. 2/ Migrants’ remittances are the sum of workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers (World Bank 2005).  
Source: Authors’ calculations; Global Development Finance database, March 2008. 
  5FDI to Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa rose from $5.8 billion in 
2000 to an estimated $17.2 billion in 2006, making FDI the second-largest source of external 
finance. However, a large part of FDI in the region is concentrated in enclave investments in a 
few resource-rich countries. Portfolio equity flows to Sub-Saharan Africa increased from $4.2 
billion in 2000 to an estimated $15.1 billion in 2006, but almost all of these flows ($ 15 billion) 
went to South Africa. Debt flows were mostly short-term bank credit secured by trade 
receivables—medium- and long-term bank lending was concentrated in Angola and South Africa, 
and international bond issuance was concentrated in South Africa until 2006.  
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa received a minuscule 2.2 percent of medium 
and long-term flows received by developing countries. Medium and long-term private capital 
flows to Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa increased from $5.1 billion in 2000 to an 
estimated $14.8 billion during 2006. Private flows to South Africa alone were significantly larger 
throughout this period (table 1). The low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan African countries 
barring South Africa and a few commodity exporters have benefited little from the surge in 
private debt and portfolio equity flows to developing countries (figure 1). 






























* Excludes South Africa.  
Source: Authors’ calculations; World Bank 2007a.  
Official aid continues to be the dominant source of external finance for Sub-Saharan Africa   
Sub-Saharan African countries rely heavily on official aid flows compared to other 
regions. At $38.2 billion, ODA is the largest source of external financing for Sub-Saharan 
  6African countries, both in dollar amounts and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). In 
2006, ODA to Sub-Saharan countries other than South Africa was $37.5 billion or 8.2 percent of 
GDP, compared with 1 percent for all developing countries. Medium- and long-term private 
capital flows were only a fraction (about 40 percent) of official flows in Sub-Saharan African 
countries other than South Africa, while they were almost 10 times the size of official aid flows 
in other developing regions (figure 1).    
Aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa declined until the late 1990s, but have increased again 
in recent years. Official aid to Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa declined 
between 1995 and 2000, from $17.4 billion to $11.7 billion. ODA has increased again in recent 
years with a substantial scaling up of aid. However, debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and the 
MDRI and exceptional debt relief provided by Paris Club creditors to Nigeria in 2005-06 have 
contributed a large share of this increase in official flows (IBRD 2007; World Bank 2007a). 
According to IBRD (2007), debt relief represented close to 70 percent of the increase in bilateral 
official development assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2005.
10 Net 
official debt flows have declined dramatically in recent years (from 1.5 percent of GDP in the 
early 1990s to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2000-05 for Sub-Saharan African countries for which data 
were available in 2005) as debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and MDRI has reduced debt 
stocks and the stream of future repayments for many Sub-Saharan African countries.
11  
Although developed countries have pledged to substantially increase aid flows to Sub-
Saharan Africa substantially over the next decade, recent pledges for scaling up aid have not yet 
materialized for many donor countries. Excluding the exceptional debt relief to Nigeria, real 
ODA flows to Sub-Saharan Africa fell in 2005 and stagnated in 2006 (IBRD 2007).
12 The 
promised doubling of aid to Africa by 2010 seems unlikely at the current rates of growth. The 
lack of predictability of future aid is a cause for concern in addition to the duplication of 
activities among donors and misalignment of the donor community priorities’ with the country’s 
development objectives.  
                                                 
10 Paris Club creditors provided $19.2 billion exceptional debt relief to Iraq and Nigeria in 2005 and a further $14 
billion in 2006 (IBRD 2007; World Bank 2007a). The HIPC Initiative launched in 1996 has committed $62 billion 
($42 billion in end-2005 net present value terms) in debt relief for 30 highly indebted low-income countries, 25 of 
which are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The MDRI, launched in 2006, deepens this debt relief by providing 100 percent 
debt cancellation by the International Monetary Fund, International Development Association and the African 
Development Fund. This debt relief amounts to $38 billion for a smaller group of 22 countries (18 of which are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa) that have reached, or will eventually reach, completion under the HIPC Initiative (IBRD 2006, 
2007; World Bank 2007b). These two initiatives together have reduced debt-service to exports from 17 percent in 
1998-99 to 4 percent in 2006 (IBRD 2007).  
11 The present value of debt stocks would eventually decline by 90 percent for the group of 30 HIPC countries. 
Lower debt stock ratios, however, may increase “free rider” risks.(IBRD 2007). 
12 Nigeria has benefited from both debt relief and the commodity price boom. Under an agreement with the Paris 
Club group of official creditors, Nigeria received $18 billion in debt relief and used its oil revenues to prepay its 
remaining obligations of $12.4 billion to the Paris Club creditors (and another $1.5 billion to London Club creditors) 
during 2005-06. This has resulted in a reduction of Nigeria’s external debt stock by more than $30 billion (World 
Bank 2007a).  
  7A new group of aid-donors—comprising Brazil, China, India, Lebanon, and Saudi 
Arabia—has emerged on the African scene. In January 2006, the Chinese government issued an 
official paper on China’s Africa policy, and at the November 2006 China-Africa Summit, China 
promised to double its aid to Africa by 2009.
13  The old relationship between India and Africa is 
now being refocused to deepen economic collaboration in the areas of trade, technology and 
training. Under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program, India spent more than 
$1 billion on aid assistance, including training, deputation of experts and implementation of 
projects. 
With traditional donors still failing to live up to their aid commitments, assistance from 
new donors could fill some of the funding gap in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, China’s and 
India’s approaches of de-linking aid from political and economic reforms have raised concerns 
among traditional donors. These new emerging donors could cause traditional aid institutions to 
lower their own standards regarding governance and environmental issues among others given 
that China and India have not been involved in the debates on aid effectiveness. In the future, the 
new aid-givers could participate in the global donor system.
14 
FDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa were comparable to other regions, but appear to be mostly 
in enclave sectors  
FDI to Sub-Saharan African countries reached an estimated $17.1 billion in 2006, 
becoming the second largest source of external financing for the region. Low-income Sub-
Saharan African countries received virtually all medium- and long-term private capital flows in 
the form of FDI. The region’s improved macroeconomic management and growth performance, 
the commodity price boom and debt relief has resulted in more investor interest. FDI to Sub-
Saharan African countries excluding South Africa more than doubled from 2000, reaching an 
estimated $17.2 billion in 2006. Although the amount received by Sub-Saharan Africa is tiny 
compared with the total FDI flows to developing countries, as a share of GDP it is equivalent to 






                                                 
13 Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao. Integrated Regional Information Networks, United Nations, November 6, 
2006, http://www.worldpress.org/africa/2554.cfm 
14 One first step in this direction has been the memorandum of understanding between the World Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank of China to improve cooperation in Africa. Initial cooperation would focus on infrastructure 
lending, in the transportation and energy sectors (Jim Adams, interview with Reuters, May 22, 2007). 
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* Excluding South Africa 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Global Development Finance database, September 2007. 
However, FDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa appear to be concentrated in enclave sectors 
such as oil and natural resources (McDonald, Treichel, and Weisfeld 2006; World Bank 2007a). 
FDI flows to oil-exporting and commodities-exporting countries were larger than in other 
countries in the region from 1990 onwards (figure 2). Oil exporters received nearly 70 percent of 
FDI to going to Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa in 2005. Net FDI inflows 
to four major oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Nigeria, and Sudan—alone were estimated at $10 billion in 2006, half of all FDI to low-income 
countries in 2006 (World Bank 2007a). Non-resource-intensive countries other than South Africa 
recorded rising but substantially lower inflows.  
Private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa are small and short-term  
Debt flows to Sub-Saharan African countries are small compared with other developing 
regions. Countries other than South Africa received an estimated $-0.6 billion annually during 
2005-06 in private medium and long-term debt flows, and $ 2.8 billion in short-term debt flows 
(usually in the form of trade credits) during 2005-06, almost half of all short-term debt flows to 
the region. The high share of short-term debt in private debt flows reflects the high risk of 
lending on unsecured terms and at longer maturities to Sub-Saharan African firms. These short-
term flows were relatively volatile and carry the risk of rapid reversal (see box 1).  
Medium and long-term flows were mostly bank lending to middle-income Sub-Saharan 
African countries. One middle-income oil-exporting country, Angola, appears to account for 
virtually all of medium and long-term bank lending to Sub-Saharan African countries other than 
South Africa in 2003–05. More recent data on syndicated loans from the Loanware database 
  9suggests that bank lending has grown since, but mainly in resource rich countries such as Angola, 
Liberia, Nigeria and Zambia.  
Bond issuance in Sub-Saharan Africa was almost exclusively limited to South Africa 
until 2006. Low and middle-income Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa 
received negligible amounts of bond financing from international markets. More recently, Ghana 
issued $750 million of international bonds in 2007, and several other Sub-Saharan African 
countries are considering international bond issues.
15   
Portfolio equity flows were almost absent in Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa  
Portfolio equity flows have increased since 1990 to an estimated $15.1 billion in 2006 
and are now an important source of external finance for Sub-Saharan Africa. However, portfolio 
flows have gone almost exclusively to South Africa ($15 billion). When South Africa is 
excluded, portfolio equity flows are negligible in low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Although South Africa has received more than $4 billion annually, on average, since 
1995, other Sub-Saharan African countries together received less than $50 million annually 
during this period. Foreign investors appear to be averse to investing in Africa because of lack of 
information, severe risk perception, and the small size of the market that makes stocks relatively 
illiquid assets. One way to encourage greater private investment in these markets could be to tap 
into the diaspora outside Africa. Some initiatives being prepared by the diaspora is the formation 
of regional funds to be invested in companies listed on African stock markets. 
Personal and institutional remittances are a growing source of external financing for Sub-
Saharan Africa 
Recorded personal remittance inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased steadily 
during the last decade, from $3.2 billion in 1995 to $9.3 billion in 2005 and to $10.3 billion in 
2006. Most of this flow ($8.5 billion) went to low-income Sub-Saharan African countries in 
2006. Unrecorded flows through informal channels are believed to be even higher (World Bank 
2005; Page and Plaza 2006).
16 In six Sub-Saharan African countries—Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland and Togo—remittances were higher than ODA flows. In Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and Togo, remittances were also greater than FDI.  
                                                 
15 Ghana, which benefited from over $4 billion in debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI, concluded a bond issue for 
$750 million with a 10 year maturity and 387 basis point spread. The resources will finance infrastructure and 
development projects. Some of the other Sub-Saharan countries that are potential candidates for entering the 
international bond market include Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia, all three of which have seen significant increases in 
the non-resident purchases of domestic public debt in recent years (World Bank 2007a).   
16 Page and Plaza (2006) estimate that 73 percent of remittances to Sub-Saharan African countries were through 
unofficial channels. Using this estimate, remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa through formal and informal channels 
would be more than $30 billion annually.  
  10 
 
Box 1: Reliance on Short-term Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Short-term debt comprises a large share of private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa.
* Even as developing 
countries in other regions reduce their dependence on short-term debt, these flows continue to be a large 
and volatile component of private debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa (see figure). After a surge in private 
short-term debt flows to Sub-Saharan Africa during the mid-1990s, these flows turned negative from 
1998 to 2002 after the Asian financial crisis. They have again increased in recent years as Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s growth performance improved. Since 1990, most private debt inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa 
have been short term.   
 














































































Medium and long-term debt Short-term debt
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Global Development Finance database, September 2007. 
 
The high share of short-term debt may be partly explained by the severe informational asymmetries and 
risk perceptions of investing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar factors also account for the dominance of 
foreign direct investment in private capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa and the small share of arm’s-
length financing through bond issuance and portfolio equity. In situations characterized by high risks, 
investors typically prefer to take direct control of their investment through FDI (Hausman and Fernandez-
Arias 2001) or resort to relationship-based bank lending that is typically short term or can be secured by 
some tangible collateral, such as trade credits (See box 2).     
 
A reliance on short-term debt can be risky for the receiving countries. Short-term debt tends to be 
procyclical in developing countries, increasing when economic growth is cyclically faster and declining 
when growth rates falter (Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha 2000). Favorable conditions attract large inflows, 
encouraging potentially unsustainable levels of consumption and investment. Changes in risk perceptions, 
however, can lead to rapid reversals, imposing larger-than-necessary adjustment costs for the receiving 
countries. 
 
* Short-term international debt is defined as cross-border debt falling due within a year. The original maturity concept followed 
by World Bank (2002) is used here. The Bank for International Settlements, however, uses a “remaining maturity” concept—that 
is, all cross-border debt falling due within one year is counted as short-term debt, regardless of its original maturity. (Dadush, 
Dasgupta, and Ratha 2000). Although conceptually different, the trends in the two are usually similar. 
  11 
However, remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have lagged behind other developing 
countries. Low-income countries received some $56 billion or 3.5 percent of GDP as remittances 
in 2006, whereas Sub-Saharan African countries other than South Africa received 2.1 percent. 
The relatively low share of recorded remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa is almost certainly 
attributable to a high share of informal transfers. 
Institutional remittances, which include grants by U.S and European foundations, were 
another category of resource flows that are large and growing steadily.
17 Institutional remittances 
to Sub-Saharan Africa increased from less than $2 billion in the early 1990s to $6.3 billion by 
2006. As with personal remittances, most institutional remittances went to the poorest countries, 
with low-income Sub-Saharan African countries receiving $5.0 billion or 1.6 percent of GDP in 
2005.  
Private foundations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, are increasingly 
becoming important players in financing development. U.S. and European foundations provide 
some $4.4 billion in grants annually for international development (Sulla 2007). However, most 
of the international assistance from U.S. foundations is channeled through global funds such as 
GAVI, international institutions, and international non-governmental organizations, and goes to 
emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, the Russian Federation, and South 
Africa, rather than the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where grants from the 
International Development Association (IDA) continue to play a dominant role.
18 This may 
result partly from a lack of information and difficulties in implementing projects in the poorest 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.    
Institutional remittances have become increasingly important for financing the most 
pressing development needs of Sub-Saharan Africa, including those essential for reaching the 
MDGs. However, some of the so-called vertical funds raise challenges because of their focus on 
specific issues, for example, diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria (see Sulla 2007 for 
recent trends and issues in grant giving by U.S. and European foundations). Multilateral 
institutions such as the IDA can help channel external assistance in a coordinated manner, 
provide support for broader sector-specific (education, health) strategies, and align these with 
Sub-Saharan African countries’ own development priorities. 
                                                 
17 Institutional remittances consist of current and capital transfers in cash or in kind payable by any resident sector 
(that is, households, government, corporations, and nonprofit institutions serving households [NPISHs]) to non-
resident households and NPISHs and receivable by resident households and NPISHs from any non-resident sector 
and excluding household to household transfers (United Nations Statistics Division 1998). NPISH is defined as a 
non-profit institution that is not predominantly financed and controlled by government and that provides goods or 
services to households free or at prices that are not economically significant.  
18 IDA countries (mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa) received an estimated $20 million from U.S. foundations in 2004, 
which was less than 3 percent of direct cross-border grants of $800 million provided by U.S. foundations in that year 
(Sulla 2007).  
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Box 2. New Players in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Emerging creditors such as China—and India on a smaller scale—have increased their financial 
involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa in the form of loans, grants, debt relief, and direct investment. 
Relevant data are not easily available, but China appears to be the largest of six new creditor nations. By 
May 2006, China had contributed $5.7 billion for more than 800 aid projects (IMF 2007). In the latest 
Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-African Cooperation in November, 2006, China announced that it 
would provide $5 billion on preferential credits for the period 2007-09 ($ 3 billion in concessional loans 
and $2 billion for export buyer credits). Counting media reports only, Export-Import Bank of China 
provided $7 billion in the period 2004-06. In May 2007, Export-Import Bank of China stated that it 
planned to provide about $20 billion in infrastructure and trade financing to Africa over the next three 
years (Financial Times 2007a). China’s investment in oil and textiles has rapidly spiked upwardly in 
Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. With the support of the Export Import Bank of China, Chinese companies 
have quickly become leaders in the development of roads, railroads, and major public buildings, as well 
as telecommunications on the continent (Broadman, Isik, Plaza, Ye, and Yoshino 2007). Chad and China 
just signed a $257 million economic package to finance several projects in the central African country 
including telecommunications, a cement factory, and roads. 
 
Chinese banks are also entering a new phase of involvement in Africa by developing partnerships with 
and buying equity stakes in African banks. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is acquiring 20 
per cent of South Africa’s Standard Bank for about $5 billion (Financial Times 2007b). The two banks 
will jointly establish a global resources fund to invest in mining, metals, and oil and gas in emerging 
markets. China Development Bank has formed a partnership with Nigeria’s United Bank for Africa to 
cooperate in financing energy and infrastructure projects in Nigeria and other West African countries 
(Oxford Analytica 2007). 
 
China has offered debt forgiveness to 31 African countries, amounting to $1.27 billion since 2000, and 
more write-offs are expected. By mid-May 2007, China had signed debt forgiveness agreements with 11 
of those countries and expected to conclude agreements with the other 22 by the end of 2007 (Wang 
2007). 
 
China’s non-concessional loans to some countries have raised concerns that it may be free-riding in 
countries that received debt relief under the MDRI and the HIPC programs (Economist 2007). According 
to some authors, however, the majority of the projects undertaken by China are in non-HIPC resource-
rich countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan (Goldstein, Pinaud, Reisen and Chen 2006). In those 
countries, these loans are part of China’s FDI directed to strategic resource seeking.
19 A $5 billion China-




                                                 
19 China and India’s investments in Africa are examples of a broader South-South investment trend. Aykut and 
Ratha (2005) show that by the late 1990s, more than a third of FDI received by developing countries originated in 
other developing countries.  
  13Capital outflows from Sub-Saharan Africa have decreased in recent years, but the stock of 
flight capital abroad remains high 
Capital outflows from Sub-Saharan African countries averaged $8.1 billion annually 
from 1990 to 2005.
20 Capital outflows from Sub-Saharan Africa increased until 2002 but have 
declined in recent years (figure 3). The cumulated stock of outflows from Sub-Saharan African 
countries was $178 billion in 2006, nearly 30 percent of GDP—down from a high of 51 percent 
of GDP in 2002. Capital outflows increased faster from middle-income and resource-rich Sub-
Saharan African countries in the 1990s, reaching 59 percent of GDP in 2002 (figure 3).
21 
 


























Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2007a. 
Several studies have identified a number of factors that encourage capital flight from 
Africa (see for example, Ajayi 1997; Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 
2001; Hermes et al. 2002; Ndikumana and Boyce 2002; Powell, Ratha, and Mohapatra 2002; 
Salisu 2005; World Bank 2004). Some of the main determinants of capital flight include 
macroeconomic instability, political instability, external borrowing, risk-adjusted rates of return 
differentials, and financial development, among others. Consistent with the view of outflows as a 
portfolio diversification choice (Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2004), the stock of cumulated 
capital outflows appears to be negatively related to the country performance rating including 
corruption, economic management and transparency (figure 4). 
 
                                                 
20 See Powell, Ratha and Mohapatra (2002) and World Bank (2002) for the construction of capital outflows as the 
difference between sources and uses of funds in the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics. 
21 Average annual capital outflows from Nigeria have been in the range of $2.5 billion since the late 1980s.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
There appears to have been capital flight reversal in the past few years. Improving 
macroeconomic fundamentals, better growth prospects, and an improving business environment 
have improved the risk-adjusted returns from investing domestically (see box 2).  
 
3. New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
This section discusses some new or hitherto-overlooked sources and some innovative 
structures for development financing in Sub-Saharan African countries. First, the section 
discusses two new sources of financing: issuance of diaspora bonds and efforts to increase 
migrant remittances by reducing money transfer costs. The section then discusses some recent 
initiatives that involve innovative financial structures—multilateral guarantees that leverage 
official financing for mobilizing private capital and the IFFIm that front-loads aid 
commitments—before describing a more generalized financial structuring that allows private 
entities to issue debt backed by future remittances and other future-flow receivables. Finally, the 
section argues for establishing sovereign credit ratings for Sub-Saharan countries, because 
ratings are key to attracting private capital.  
New sources of financing 
Diaspora bonds 
A diaspora bond is a debt instrument issued by a country—or, potentially, by a sub-
sovereign entity or by a private corporation—to raise financing from its overseas diaspora. India 
and Israel have raised $11 billion and $25 billion, respectively, from their diaspora abroad 
(Ketkar and Ratha 2007). The diaspora usually have more information about their country of 
origin. These bonds are issued often in times of crisis and often at a “patriotic” discount. Unlike 
  15international investors, the diaspora tend to be less averse to convertibility risk because they are 
likely to have current and contingent liabilities in their home country. Further, the diaspora 
usually have a strong desire to contribute to the development of their home country and are 
therefore more likely to purchase diaspora bonds.  
 
Table 2: Potential market for diaspora bonds 
  Diaspora stock ('000) 
Potential diaspora 
saving ($ bil.) 
South Africa  713  2.9 
Nigeria 837  2.8 
Kenya 427  1.7 
Ghana 907  1.7 
Ethiopia 446  1.6 
Somalia 441  1.6 
Senegal 463  1.3 
Zimbabwe 761  1.0 
Sudan 587  1.0 
Angola 523  1.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  572  0.8 
Cape Verde  181  0.7 
Uganda 155  0.7 
Mauritius 119  0.7 
Cameroon 231  0.6 
Mozambique 803  0.6 
Madagascar 151  0.6 
Tanzania 189  0.6 
Eritrea 849  0.6 
Mali 1,213  0.6 
Other SSA countries  5,285  5.5 
Total  15,854 28.5 
* Diaspora stocks for 2005 includes only identified migrants from Ratha and Shaw (2007). Diaspora savings are 
calculated assuming migrants earned the average per capita income of the host country and saved one-fifth of their 
income. Under the alternative scenario of African migrants earning half of the per capita income in the host 
countries and saving a fifth of their income, the potential annual saving of the African diaspora would be over $10 
billion. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2 shows estimates of the diaspora stocks of Sub-Saharan African countries and 
their annual savings. The stock of Sub-Saharan African diaspora is estimated to be about 16 
million, with 5 million in high-income countries. Assuming that members of the Sub-Saharan 
African diaspora earn the average income of their host countries and save a fifth of their income, 
their annual savings would be more than $28 billion. Most of these savings would come from the 
migrants in the OECD countries, where a third of Sub-Saharan African diaspora are located, due 
to the larger income differentials. In an alternative scenario, if the Sub-Saharan African diaspora 
were assumed to earn half the average per capita income in the host countries and saved only 20 
percent of their income, the annual savings of the African diaspora would still be over $10 
  16billion. Presently the bulk of this saving is invested outside Africa. African governments and 
private corporations can potentially tap into these resources by issuing diaspora bonds. Diaspora 
bonds can also provide an instrument for repatriation of Africa’s flight capital, estimated at more 
than $170 billion (as discussed). Diaspora bonds could potentially raise $5 billion to 10 billion 
annually by tapping into the wealth of the African diaspora abroad and the flight capital held 
abroad by its residents.
22  
While the size of the potential market for diaspora bonds is indeed impressive, it may be 
difficult for some unrated Sub-Saharan African countries that are characterized by high risks to 
issue diaspora bonds. Some of the constraints that Sub-Saharan African countries may face in 
issuing diaspora bonds include weak and non-transparent legal systems for contract enforcement; 
a lack of national banks and other institutions in destination countries, which can facilitate the 
marketing of these bonds; and a lack of clarity on regulations in the host countries that allow or 
constrain diaspora members from investing in these bonds (Chander 2001; Ketkar and Ratha 
2007).  However, because of recent debt relief initiatives and improving macroeconomic 
management, many Sub-Saharan African countries are in a better position to access private 
capital markets than anytime in recent decades. 
Reducing remittance costs 
Reducing remittance costs would increase remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa is believed to have the highest share of remittances flowing through informal 
channels among all regions (Page and Plaza 2006).
23 This is partly because of the high cost of 
sending remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the average cost, including foreign 
exchange premium, of sending $200 from London to Lagos, Nigeria, in mid-2006 was 14.4 
percent of the amount, and the cost from Cotonou, Benin, to Lagos was more than 17 percent 
(Ratha and Shaw 2007). Reducing remittance fees would increase the disposable income of 
remitters, encouraging them to remit large amounts and at greater frequencies. It would also 
encourage remittance senders to shift from informal to formal channels.  
Estimating the additional remittance flows that would result from a decrease in 
remittance cost is complicated by several factors. For example, remittances sent for an 
immediate family emergency may not be responsive to costs. However, estimates based on 
surveys of Tongan migrants indicate the cost elasticity to be in the range of .22, that is, a 1 
percent decrease in cost would increase remittances by 0.22 percent (Gibson, McKenzie, and 
Rohorua 2006). For example, halving remittance costs from the current high levels, from 14 
                                                 
22 South Africa is reported to have launched a project to issue Reconciliation and Development (R&D) bonds to both 
expatriate and domestic investors (Bradlow 2006). Ghana has begun marketing the Golden Jubilee Savings Bond to 
the Ghanaian diaspora in Europe and the United States. 
23 Page and Plaza (2006) estimate that almost three-quarter of remittances to Sub-Saharan African Africa were 
through unofficial channels. 
  17percent to 7 percent for the London-Lagos corridor, would thus increase remittances by 11 
percent. This change implies additional remittance flows of more than $1 billion every year. 
Assuming that the reduction in remittance cost also succeeds in bringing half the unrecorded 
remittances into formal channels, this would result in an increase in recorded remittances flows 
to Sub-Saharan Africa of $2.5 billion.    
Remittances costs faced by poor migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries can be 
reduced by improving the access to banking for remittance senders and recipients and by 
strengthening competition in the remittance industry (Ratha 2007, World Bank 2005). Clarifying 
regulations related to anti-money laundering and the countering the financing of terrorism and 
avoiding overregulation, such as requiring a full banking license for specialized money transfer 
operators, would facilitate the entry of new players. It would also encourage the adoption of 
more efficient technologies such as the use of internet and mobile phone technology. Sharing 
payment platforms and non-exclusive partnerships between remittance service providers and 




World Bank and IDA partial risk guarantees of some $3 billion were successful in 
catalyzing $12 billion in private financing in 28 operations in developing countries during the 
last decade (Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner 2006). These typically cover project financing in 
large infrastructure projects and other sectors with high social returns. World Bank guarantees 
include partial risk guarantees and partial credit guarantees that cover private debt for large 
public projects (typically infrastructure). Although the former typically cover the risk of 
nonperformance of sovereign contractual obligations, the latter cover a much broader range of 
credit risks and are designed to lower the cost and extend the maturity of debt (Matsukawa and 
Habeck 2007).
24 Political risk guarantees issued by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) have helped alleviate political and others risks in agribusiness, manufacturing 
and tourism. The African Export-Import Bank and other agencies provide guarantees for trade 
credits (See box 3). There appears to be potential to increase the use of IDA guarantees beyond 
large infrastructure projects to small and medium enterprises. 
                                                 
24 Partial risk guarantees have been typically provided for private-sector projects in all countries, including IDA-
eligible poor countries, and partial credit guarantees usually to public investment project in countries eligible for 
IBRD loans. In addition, policy based guarantees are extended to help well-performing IBRD-eligible governments 
access capital markets. 
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Box 3: Trade Finance as an Attractive Short-term Financing Option 
 
Trade finance is an attractive way of increasing short-term financing to risky African countries in the 
presence of asymmetric information. Firms operating in international markets require financing for the 
purchase of their imports and for the production of their exports. Many African firms, however, have 
no access to trade finance or instruments to support their operations because of information 
asymmetries and their perceived greater risk. Larger firms that have access to credit from importers, 
the banking system (typically from affiliates of European global banking corporations whose core 
business is often short-term trade finance), or other non-bank financial institutions often provide trade 
credit to their smaller suppliers, who in many cases have no access to credit.  
 
In recent years, the export credit agencies of China and India have become increasingly prominent in 
promoting trade finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, not only for raw materials, commodities, and natural 
resources, but also for capital goods (machinery, equipment) and manufactured products. In 2006, the 
Export-Import Bank of India extended a $250 million line of credit to ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID) to finance India’s exports to the 15 member countries of EBID. It has also 
previously extended trade financing to the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development 
Bank (PTA Bank) for $50 million to promote India’s exports to 16 eastern and southern African 
countries. The Export-Import Bank of China is financing a larger set of activities, providing export 
credit, loans for construction contracts and investment projects (including energy and communication 
projects), and concessional loans and guarantees. 
 
The World Bank is supporting an innovative project through its Regional Trade Facilitation Program  
to address the gaps in the private political and credit risk insurance market for cross-border 
transactions involving African countries. The project is managed by the African Trade Insurance 
Agency (ATI), a multilateral agency set up by treaty, and brings together a group of countries in the 
southern and eastern African regions to develop a credible insurance mechanism. To date, ATI has 
facilitated $110.7 million in trade and investments in ATI member countries, using only $21.6 million 
of IDA resources—a gearing ratio of almost five to one in sectors that include mining (Zambia), 
housing (the Democratic Republic of Congo), flowers (Kenya), and telecommunications (Burundi and 
Uganda). Clients have indicated that without ATI’s support, they might not have received the 
necessary financing. 
 
Although trade finance can facilitate trade and economic linkages with Africa’s major trading 
partners, Africa needs additional longer-term sources of external finance. Trade finance is typically 
short term and carries many risks associated with short-term debt (see box 1). The recent expansion of 
trade finance may also partly reflect the inability of Sub-Saharan African countries to obtain 
unsecured financing at longer maturities. Enhancing the scope and volume of trade finance can 
facilitate trade and improve regional economic cooperation, but additional external resource flows are 
required to finance the projects in infrastructure, manufacturing, education and health that have high 
social returns and involve significantly longer time horizons.   
The first-ever IDA partial risk guarantee in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1999 for the Azito 
power project in Côte d'Ivoire catalyzed private financing of $200 million while keeping IDA 
support to $30 million, or 15 percent of the project (World Bank 1999). IDA partial risk 
guarantees are under preparation for the 250 megawatt Bujagali hydropower project in Uganda, a 
50 megawatt hydropower project in Sierra Leone, and a project to increase power sector 
efficiency in Senegal (World Bank 2007c).  
  19There is potential for extending the scope and reach of guarantees to use aid resources to 
catalyze large volumes of private financing in Sub-Saharan Africa beyond the traditional large 
infrastructure projects and beyond sovereign borrowers. Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner (2006) 
suggest that guarantees should be available not only to foreign investors but also to domestic 
investors including pension and insurance funds, to raise local currency financing. Guarantee 
facilities can be established to support several small projects in the same sector, similar to a 
“master trust” arrangement. Innovations include service guarantees that can protect investors 
against service failures in areas such as power, customs, and licensing that discourage private 
investment in Sub-Saharan African countries.   
IFFIm, AMC and other innovative structuring by public-private partnerships 
Several international initiatives are underway for innovative development financing 
mechanisms. They include a search for new sources of financing, innovative ways of realizing 
future commitments, and innovative ways of using existing resources. The IFFIm is an 
innovative structuring mechanism for realizing future aid commitments to introduce more 
reliable and predictable aid flows for immunization programs and health system development for 
GAVI.
25 IFFIm raised $1 billion in 2006 and plans to raise $4 billion more during the next 10 
years by 'securitizing'—in other words, front-loading—future aid commitments from several 
donor countries (France, Italy, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
The donor countries have signed legally binding agreements with the GAVI Fund Affiliate to 
provide future grants to IFFIm, which issues the bonds in international markets. IFFIm disburses 
the proceeds as required for GAVI-approved programs to procure needed vaccines and to 
strengthen the health systems of recipient countries. Future grant flows from donors are used to 
repay bondholders. The backing of highly creditworthy developed country donors has enabled 
IFFIm to issue AAA rated bonds in international capital markets at competitive spreads.  
Such a facility, however, faces several constraints, including the question of 
“additionality” (whether the countries that bought the bonds will reduce aid), high transaction 
costs, and whether the coupon yield will be paid for by sovereign bond guarantors or subtracted 
from the proceeds.  
The Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) for vaccines launched in February 2007 is 
another innovative structuring mechanism that would complement the efforts of IFFIm by 
providing financial incentives to accelerate the development of vaccines important to developing 
countries. The donors provide up-front financing for the AMC, which negotiates with the 
                                                 
25 The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), a public-private partnership for combating disease, 
was created in 1999 and has received  grant commitments of $1.5 billion from the Gates Foundation, with additional 
contributions coming from Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the US, UK, EU, and the World Bank. See 
www.gavialliance.org.  
  20pharmaceutical industry to provide a set level of funding in return for future supply at an agreed 
price for the manufacturer that first develops the vaccine (GAVI and World Bank 2006). Canada, 
Italy, Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the Gates Foundation have provided $1.5 billion 
for the pilot AMC to develop a vaccine for pneumococcal disease which causes 1.9 million child 
deaths a year. The AMC is not expected to increase aid flows substantially to poor countries, but 
it brings together public and private donors in an innovative way to help meet the MDGs (IBRD 
2007).
26            
Other public-private partnerships to generate new sources of innovative financing that are 
under consideration include a currency transaction levy, airline and environmental taxes and 
private contributions.
27 Introducing a one basis point levy on currency transactions could yield 
over $16 billion in revenue annually, according to Hillman, Kapoor and Spratt (2006). This 
variation of a Tobin tax, however, is not popular with the financial institutions, nor with 
countries that are major financial centers. Such taxes would cause friction in financial 
transactions and have cascading effects. Airline taxes are already being implemented in some 
countries (e.g., eight countries including France have raised $250 million in 2007), but there are 
questions as to whether these were new taxes (IBRD 2007).
28  
These public-private partnerships, however, rely on donor government efforts to mobilize 
financing and are subject to the same concerns about aid allocation, coordination and 
effectiveness. These innovative projects are not designed for catalyzing private-to-private flows 
to developing countries from the international capital markets.  
A new initiative by the World Bank Group—the Global Emerging Markets Local 
Currency (Gemloc) Bond Fund announced in October 2007—proposes to raise $5 billion from 
international capital markets to invest in local-currency bond markets in developing countries.
29 
The Gemloc public-private partnership will mobilize local-currency denominated resources for 
governments in selected emerging market countries, thereby eliminating the devaluation risk 
associated with foreign-currency borrowing. Corporate bonds will be included subsequently, but 
at least 70 percent of the proceeds of Gemloc would be invested in local-currency bonds issued 
by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.   
                                                 
26 Birdsall and Subramanian (2007) argue that international financial institutions have traditionally under-funded the 
provision of global public goods (GPGs) and have not been adequately involved in the development of new GPG 
products such as the AMC, preferring instead to provide loans and grants to individual countries.  
27 See Skare (2007), Trepelkov (2007), and the discussions of the Second and the Third Plenary Meetings of the 
Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development established in March 2006. 
(http://www.innovativefinance-oslo.no/recommendedreading.cfm, and http://www.innovativefinance.go.kr).  
Among the innovative financing projects, 28 countries of the Leading Group are considering introduction of an Air 
Ticket Solidarity Levy to funding for improving access to treatments against HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria through the 
International Drug Purchase Facility, UNITAID.  
28 The solidarity levy on airline tickets has been implemented by France, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, Republic of 
Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius and Niger. (See www.unitaid.eu) 
29 See www.gemloc.org for further details. 
  21The creation of an independent and transparent benchmark index and “investability” 
rankings of countries’ local-currency bonds markets are expected to facilitate external financing 
flows to emerging markets. Like portfolio equity flows, however, the Gemloc is likely to favor 
middle-income countries with market access. Although the Gemloc plans to include Kenya, 
Nigeria and West African countries in a subsequent phase, most of the countries selected for the 
first phase (for example, Brazil, China, India and South Africa) are countries with sovereign 
ratings in the BB or BBB category. It is also not entirely clear whether the Gemloc would result 
in additional funding or whether it might substitute portfolio equity flows.
30  
Future-flow securitization 
Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise significant bond financing by using 
securitization of future-flows, such as remittances, tourism receipts and export receivables. 
Securitization of future hard-currency receivables is a potential means of improving the access of 
Sub-Saharan African countries to international capital markets. In a typical future-flow 
transaction, the borrower pledges its future foreign-currency receivables—for example, oil, 
remittances, credit card receivables, airline ticket receivables—as collateral to a special purpose 
vehicle (Ketkar and Ratha 2001, 2005). The special purpose vehicle issues the debt. By a legal 
arrangement between the borrowing entity and major international customers or correspondent 
banks, the future receivables are deposited directly in an offshore collection account managed by 
a trustee. The debt is serviced from this account, and excess collections are forwarded to the 
borrowing entity in the developing country.
31  
This future flow securitization mitigates sovereign transfer and convertibility risks and 
allows the securities to be rated better than the sovereign credit rating. These securities are 
typically structured to obtain an investment grade rating. For example, in the case of El Salvador, 
the remittance-backed securities were rated investment grade, two to four notches above the sub-
investment grade sovereign rating. Investment-grade rating makes these transactions attractive to 
a wider range of “buy-and-hold” investors (for example, insurance companies) that face 
limitations on buying sub-investment grade. As a result, the issuer can access international 
capital markets at a lower interest rate spread and longer maturity. Moreover, by establishing a 
                                                 
30 Under a more recent proposal advocated by the World Bank, sovereign wealth funds which are estimated to hold 
more than $3 trillion in assets would be encouraged to invest 1 percent of that in Sub-Saharan Africa. This proposed 
“one percent” initiative would use the GEMLOC bond index and investability rankings (as well as promote the 
development of other market-based indices) to encourage investments by sovereign wealth funds in African markets. 
If successful, this would translate into $30 billion of additional resource flows to African countries.     
31 Such transactions also often resort to excess coverage to mitigate the risk of volatility and seasonality in future 
flows. 
  22credit history for the borrower, these deals enhance the ability to obtain and reduce the costs of 
accessing capital markets in the future.
32 
We estimate the potential size of future flow securitizations for various kinds of flows, 
including remittances, for Sub-Saharan Africa based on the methodology of Ketkar and Ratha 
(2001, 2005) using an over-collateralization ratio of five to one and average flows in 2003-06. 
These calculations indicate that the potential future flow securitization is $17 billion annually, 
with remittance securitization alone in the range of $2 billion (table 3). These include only the 
securitization of remittances recorded in the balance of payments. The actual unrecorded 
remittances through formal and informal channels are estimated to be a multiple in several 
countries (Page and Plaza 2006).  
Remittances are a large and stable source of external financing that can be creatively 
leveraged for Sub-Saharan Africa’s development goals. Remittances can improve capital market 
access of banks and governments in poor countries by improving ratings and securitization 
structures (Ratha 2006). Hard currency remittances, properly accounted, can significantly 
improve a country’s risk rating. It may even encourage many poor countries that are currently 
not rated to obtain a credit rating from major international rating agencies (see the following for 
more discussion). 
Table 3: Securitization potential in Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ billion) 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  Low income (excl. India)  All developing 
















Fuel exports*  44.1 8.8 47.7 9.5  417.5  83.5 
Agricultural raw 
materials exports*  5.7 1.1 4.4 0.9  46.3  9.3 
Ores and metals 
exports*  13.4  2.7 5.0 1.0  106.6  21.3 
Travel services**  12.4  2.5 4.8 1.0  168.5  33.7 
Remittances**  8.4  1.7 23.6 4.7  179.4  35.9 
Total  84.0 16.8 85.5 17.1  918.3  183.7 
* Average for 2003-05; ** average for 2003-06. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using over-collateralization ratio of 5:1. Data on exports are from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Worker remittances, defined as in Ratha (2003), are 
calculated from the IMF’s Balance-of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2007.  
The African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) has been active in facilitating future 
flow securitization since the late 1990s. In 1996, it co-arranged the first ever future-flow 
                                                 
32 Obtaining a rating is important for raising not only bond financing or bank loans, but also foreign direct 
investment and even official aid (Ratha, De and Mohapatra 2007). Any improvement in sovereign rating is likely to 
translate into an improvement in the rating of sub-sovereign borrowers whose foreign currency borrowing is 
typically subject to the sovereign rating ceiling. 
  23securitization by a Sub-Saharan African country, a $40 million medium-term loan in favor of a 
development bank in Ghana backed by its Western Union remittance receivables (Afreximbank 
2005, Rutten and Oramah 2006). The bank launched its Financial Future-flow Pre-financing 
Programme in 2001 to expand the use of migrant remittances and other future flows—credit card 
and checks, royalties arising from bilateral air services agreements over flight fees, and so 
forth—as collateral to leverage external financing to fund agricultural and other projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In recent year, the Afreximbank has arranged a $50 million remittance-backed 
syndicated note issuance facility in favor of a Nigerian entity using Moneygram receivables in 
2001, and it co-arranged a $ 40 million remittance-backed syndicated term loan facility in favor 
of an Ethiopian bank using its Western Union receivables in 2004 (Afreximbank 2005).  
There are, however, several institutional constraints to future-flow securitization in Sub-
Saharan Africa. A low level of domestic financial development; lack of banking-relationships 
with banks abroad; and high fixed costs of legal, investment banking, and credit-rating services, 
especially in poor countries with few large entities, make the use of these instruments especially 
difficult for Sub-Saharan countries.  Absence of an appropriate legal infrastructure and weak 
protection of creditor rights (including inadequate or poorly-enforced bankruptcy laws) and a 
volatile macroeconomic environment can also pose difficulties. In the case of remittance 
securitization, extensive use of informal channels in Sub-Saharan Africa can reduce the flows 
through the formal financial system and thereby the size of potential securitization.  
Securitization by poor countries carries significant risks—currency devaluation and, in 
the case of flexible rate debt, unexpected increases in interest rates—that are associated with 
market-based foreign currency debt (World Bank 2005). Securitization of remittances (and other 
future flows) by public sector entities reduces the government’s flexibility in managing its 
external payments and can conflict with the negative pledge provision included in multilateral 
agencies’ loan and guarantee agreements, which prohibit the establishment of a priority for other 
debts over the multilateral debts. 
Still, this asset class can provide useful access to international capital markets, especially 
during liquidity crises. Moreover, for many developing countries securitization backed by future 
flows of receivables may be the only way to begin accessing such markets. Given the long lead 
times involved in such deals, however, issuers need to keep securitization deals in the pipeline 
and investors engaged during good times so that such deals remain accessible during crises.  
Recovery of stolen assets 
Other innovative ways of using existing resources include recovery of flight capital and 
stolen assets. The cross-border flow of the global proceeds from criminal activities, corruption, 
  24and tax evasion are estimated to be more than $1 trillion annually.
33 Some $20 billion to $40 
billion in assets acquired by corrupt leaders of poor countries, mostly in Africa, are kept overseas. 
The World Bank and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime have launched the Stolen 
Assets Recovery (StAR) initiative to help countries recover their stolen assets. This initiative will 
help countries establish institutions that can detect and deter illegal flow of funds, work with the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in ratifying the Convention 
against Corruption, and support and monitor the use of recovered funds for development 
activities. These recovered assets could provide financing for social programs and 
infrastructure.
34  
Establishing and improving sovereign ratings can facilitate market access 
Sovereign risk ratings not only affect investment decisions in the international bond and 
loan markets, but they also affect allocation of FDI and portfolio equity flows (Ratha, De and 
Mohapatra 2007). The allocation of performance-based official aid is also increasingly being 
linked to sovereign rating.  The foreign currency rating of the sovereign typically acts as a 
ceiling for the foreign currency rating of sub-sovereign entities. Even when the sovereign is not 
issuing bonds, a sovereign rating provides a benchmark for the capital market activities of the 
private sector.   
Borrowing costs rise exponentially with a lowering of the credit rating (figure 5). There is 
also a threshold effect when borrowing spreads jump up as the rating slides below the investment 
grade (Ratha, De and Mohapatra 2007). A borrowing entity with a low credit rating, therefore, 
can significantly improve borrowing terms (that is, lower interest spread and increase maturity) 
by paying up front for a better credit rating. 
Only 21 Sub-Saharan African countries had been rated by a major international rating 
agency as of December 2007 (Table 4).
35 The average rating of Sub-Saharan African countries 
remains low compared with other regions, restricting the access of their private sector to 
international capital. As noted in the previous section, private debt and equity flows to Sub-
Saharan African countries were the lowest among all regions. Some authors have pointed to the 
                                                 
33 “Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan.” UNODC and World 
Bank. September 2007. (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf). 25 percent of GDP 
of African states is estimated to be lost to corruption every year, with corrupt actions encompassing petty bribe-
taking done by low level government officials to inflated public procurement contracts, kickbacks, and raiding the 
public treasury as part of public asset theft by political leaders. 
34 For example, Nigeria has been successfully recovered half a billion dollars in stolen assets from Swiss sources 
with cooperation of the World Bank, civil society and the Swiss authorities. 
35 Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007) argue that several factors may make it difficult for poor countries to get rated. 
The information required for the rating process can be complex and not readily available in many countries. The 
institutional and legal environment governing property rights and sale of securities may be absent or weak, 
prompting reluctance on the part of politicians to get publicly “judged” by the rating analysts. The fact that the 
country has to request a rating, and has to pay a fee for that, but has no say over the final rating outcome can also be 
discouraging.       
  25existence of an “Africa premium”—equivalent to roughly 2 rating notches or 200 basis points—
even for relatively better-performing countries with above-median growth and low aid-
dependence (Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner 2006).  




















































Investment grade premium  
(basis points)
  2003    191
  2004    122
  2005      92
  2006      64




* Assuming $100 million sovereign bond issue with a 7 years tenor. Borrowing costs have 
fallen steadily since 2003 with a slight reversal more recently reflecting changes in the global 
liquidity situation. The investment grade premium indicates the rise in spreads when rating 
falls below BBB-. The relationship between sovereign ratings and spreads is based on the 
following regression: log(launch spread) = 2.58 - 1.2 investment grade dummy + 0.15 
sovereign rating + 0.23 log(issue size) + 0.03 maturity - 0.44 year 2004 dummy - 0.73 year 
2005 dummy - 1.10 year 2006 dummy - 1.05 year 2007 dummy; N = 200; Adjusted R
2 = 
0.70. All the coefficients were significant at 5 percent. A lower numeric value of the 
sovereign rating indicates a better rating. 
Source: Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007) based on Bondware and Standard and Poor’s.  
 
At the sub-sovereign level, few firms in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa are 
rated by the three international rating agencies.
36 Several firms are highly creditworthy in local 
currency terms but they are constrained by either an absent or low foreign currency sovereign 
rating. 
Model-based estimates indicate that several unrated Sub-Saharan African countries 
would be rated higher than currently believed. Drawing on the well-established literature on the 
empirical determinants of sovereign ratings, Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2007) find that the 
                                                 
36 Only 5 banks in all of Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa (4 in Nigeria and 1 in Mauritius) were in 
Standard and Poor’s global debt issuers list. In contrast, South Africa had nearly 30 firms and banks in the list.  
  26predicted or shadow sovereign ratings for several Sub-Saharan African countries that are 
currently unrated are in a similar range as some established emerging markets (table 5).
37  
Table 4: Rated Sub-Saharan African countries (December 2007) 
S&P Moody’s Fitch   
Rating Date Rating Date Rating Date 
Predicted 
shadow rating* 
Botswana  A  Apr 2001  Aa3  May 2006      AA to AAA 
South Africa  BBB+  Aug 2005  Baa1  Jan 2005  BBB+  Aug 2005  BBB to BBB+ 
Mauritius      Baa1  May 2006      BBB+ to A- 
Namibia          BBB-  Dec 2005  BBB- to BBB 
Lesotho          BB-  Nov 2005  BB to BB+ 
Gabon  BB-  Nov 2007      BB-  Oct 2007  BBB- to BBB 
Nigeria  BB- Feb  2006      BB- Jan  2006 BB  to  BBB- 
Cape Verde          B+  Aug 2003  BBB- 
Ghana  B+ Sep  2003      B+ Sep  2007  BB-  to  BB 
Kenya  B+  Sep  2006        B  to  B+ 
Senegal  B+  Dec  2000        BB  to  BB+ 
Seychelles  B  Sep  2006        BB  to  BBB- 
Cameroon  B  Feb 2007      B  Jun 2006  BB- to BB 
Benin  B Sep  2006      B Sep  2004  BB-  to  BB 
Burkina Faso  B  Mar 2004          B to B+ 
Madagascar  B  May 2004          B to B+ 
Mozambique  B Jul  2004      B Jul  2003  B+  to  BB- 
Uganda         B  Mar  2005  BB- 
Mali B  May  2004      B-  Apr  2004  BB 
Malawi       B-  Mar  2007  CCC+  to  B 
The Gambia          CCC  Dec 2005  B+ to BB- 
* These shadow ratings are based on forecasts of explanatory variables for 2007 for the benchmark sovereign rating 
model of Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007). Source: Rating from Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.  
 
Sub-Saharan African countries with large remittance inflows can leverage those inflows 
for raising the sovereign rating (Ratha 2006). Preliminary estimates indicate that including 
remittances in the debt-to-exports ratio in creditworthiness assessments would result in an 
improvement in sovereign ratings by up to two notches (World Bank 2005a). The securitization 
of future receivables, including trade payments and future remittances, can further improve the 
rating of the transaction, typically to investment grade (BBB). For example, the spread saving 




                                                 
37 This literature models sovereign ratings as a function of macroeconomic and institutional variables (See Cantor 
and Packer 1995, Mora 2006). Interestingly, the benchmark model of Ratha, De and Mohapatra (2007) performs 
quite well for Sub-Saharan African countries. The predicted or shadow ratings for the 11 Sub-Saharan African 
countries rated under the recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiative were within one to two 
notches of the actual rating assigned by Standard and Poor’s, as of the end of 2006. The model successfully 
predicted the rating of the recent bond issue from Ghana. 
  27Table 5: Shadow sovereign ratings for unrated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(December 2007) 
  Predicted shadow rating*  Rated countries in the same range 
Equatorial Guinea  BBB- to BBB  Mexico; India; Romania 
Angola  BB+  El Salvador; Peru 
Swaziland  BB- to BB+  Brazil; Turkey; Peru 
Zambia  BB- to BB  Brazil; Turkey 
Tanzania BB-  Turkey;  Uruguay 
Congo, Rep.  B+ to BB-  Pakistan; Turkey 
Niger  B- to B  Argentina; Bolivia; Paraguay 
Rwanda  B- to B  Argentina; Bolivia; Paraguay 
Togo  CCC+ to B-  Bolivia; Ecuador; Paraguay 
Mauritania  CCC to  B  Dominican Rep.; Ecuador 
Cote d'Ivoire  CCC to B  Dominican Rep.; Ecuador 
Sierra Leone  CCC to B  Ecuador; Pakistan 
Ethiopia  CCC to CCC+  Ecuador 
Sudan  CCC- to CCC+  Ecuador 
Comoros  CCC- to CCC+  Ecuador 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  CCC- to CCC  Ecuador 
Guinea  CC to CCC  Ecuador 
Chad  C to CCC+  Ecuador 
Guinea-Bissau  C to  CC   
Zimbabwe  C or lower    
* Shadow ratings use forecasts of explanatory variables for 2007 for the benchmark sovereign rating model of Ratha, 
De and Mohapatra (2007). 
Source: Rating from Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.  
 
Sub-Saharan African countries that received debt relief and improved their 
macroeconomic management appear to be better positioned to access international markets. Debt 
relief under the HIPC Initiative and under the MDRI has reduced the external debt-service 
obligations for 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since mid-2005, private foreign investors 
have started acquiring government debt in local currencies in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2006).  
Investors have been attracted by high yields relative to the perceived risk, better macroeconomic 
fundamentals, and diversification benefits (IMF 2006, 2007). Countries that have elicited the 
most investor interest are Bostwana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. 
Also, Gabon, an oil-exporting middle-income African country, is preparing to raise $1 billion in 
international capital markets; it was rated by Fitch in late October 2007 and by Standard and 
Poor’s in November 2007.




                                                 
38 Both rating agencies assigned Gabon a BB- rating, citing its relatively high income per capita and large external 
and fiscal surpluses derived from buoyant oil revenues. The proceeds of the bond will be used to buy back 
outstanding Paris Club debt. (“Gabon assigned 'BB-' long-term issuer default rating with stable outlook – Fitch” 
AFX News Limited, October 30, 2007; “International, domestic bonds likely in Gabon-S&P” Reuters, November 9, 
2007). Also, Kenya, a B+ rated country, is reported to be planning a Eurobond issuance in the near future. 
  284. Conclusion 
Both official and private flows to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased in recent years, a 
welcome reversal of the declining or flat trend seen during the 1990s. The picture is less rosy, 
however, when Sub-Saharan Africa is compared to the other developing regions, and more 
importantly, to its enormous resource needs for growth, poverty reduction, and other Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa continues to depend on 
official aid. The recent increase in ODA appears to be driven by one-off debt relief provided 
through HIPC and MDRI; the prospect for scaling up aid is not entirely certain.
39 FDI flows to 
the region are concentrated in enclave investments in oil-exporting countries. Portfolio bond and 
equity flows are negligible outside South Africa, although several African countries are 
considering bond issues in international markets. Private debt flows are small and dominated by 
relationship-based commercial bank lending; and even these flows are largely short-term in tenor. 
More than half of the countries in the region do not have a sovereign rating from the major credit 
rating agencies, and the few rated countries have sub-investment grade ratings. Low or absent 
credit ratings impede not only sovereign, but also private sector efforts to raise financing in the 
capital markets. Capital outflows appear to be smaller than in the previous decade, but the stock 
of flight capital from the region remains very high. Migrant remittances appear to be increasing, 
but a large part of the flows bypass formal financial channels.  
In short, the development community has little choice but to continue to explore new 
sources of financing, innovative private-to-private sector solutions, and public-private 
partnerships to mobilize additional international financing. An analysis of country 
creditworthiness suggests that many countries in the region may be more creditworthy than 
previously believed. Establishing sovereign rating benchmarks and credit enhancement through 
guarantee instruments provided by multilateral aid agencies would facilitate market access. 
Creative financial structuring such as the International Financing Facility for Immunization 
(IFFIm) can help front-load aid commitments, although these may not result in additional 
financing in the long run. Preliminary estimates suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries can 
potentially raise $1-3 billion by reducing the cost of international migrant remittances, $5-10 
billion by issuing diaspora bonds, and $17 billion by securitizing future remittances and other 
future receivables. 
In raising financing via these means, African countries will face several challenges. 
Leveraging remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa’s development will imply efforts to significantly 
improve both migration and remittances data. Remittances are private flows, and governments 
should not try to direct the use of remittances nor should they think of them as a substitute for 
official aid. Instead, governments should try to reduce costs, increase flows through banking 
                                                 
39  For the literature on aid effectiveness, see Collier (2006); Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003); Easterly 
(2006); Sundberg and Gelb (2006); Radelet (2006); and Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
  29channels, and constructively leverage on these flows to improve capital market access of banks 
and governments in poor countries by improving ratings and securitization structures.
40 
Efforts to attract private capital to Africa are constrained by shallow domestic financial 
markets, lack of securitization laws, a paucity of investment-grade firms and banks in local-
currency terms, and absence of national credit-rating agencies. African countries, however, need 
to be cautious when resorting to market-based debt. It is essential that the borrowing space 
created by debt relief is used prudently, and not used to borrow excessively at commercial terms 
(IBRD 2007). “Free riding” by commercial and bilateral creditors can even lead to another round 
of excessive accumulation of debt. Countries should also monitor and manage short-term 
external debt (especially those intermediated by domestic banks) to avoid currency and maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities and potential liquidity crisis (Dadush, Dasgupta and 
Ratha 2000). Short-term capital flows can reverse rapidly with potentially destabilizing effects 
on the financial markets.  
The findings in this paper suggest that Sub-Saharan African countries need to make 
external finance more broad-based, attract a broader category of investors such as pension funds 
and institutional investors; and expand public-private partnerships to raise additional external 
financing.
41 Donors and international financial institutions can play an important role by 
providing guarantees, political risk insurance, help in establishing ratings, and providing advice 
on financial instruments such as securitization of remittances and other future-flow receivables. 
Accessing private capital markets in a responsible manner will require a sound contractual 
environment as well as credible monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. 
                                                 
40 Shifting remittances from informal to formal channels may require eliminating parallel market premiums, 
improving access to formal finance for poor households, and reducing regulatory barriers to entry of new operators. 
41 Since this study has focused on mobilizing new sources of financing, we have omitted discussion of structural and 
investment climate factors that impede private investment in Africa. This literature is summarized in Bhattacharya, 
Montiel and Sharma (1997); Bhinda and others (1999); Gelb, Ramachandran and Turner (2006); Kasekende and 
Bhundia (2000); and World Bank (2002).     
  30References 
 
Afreximbank (African Export-Import Bank). 2005. Annual Report. 
(http://www.afreximbank.com) 
Ajayi, S. Ibi. 1997. “An Analysis of External Debt and Capital flight in the Severely Indebted 
Low-Income Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Working Paper 97/68. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Aykut, Dilek, and Dilip Ratha. 2005. “South-South FDI flows: How big are they?” 
Transnational Corporations 13(1): 148-176. 
Bhattacharya, Amar, Peter Montiel, and Sunil Sharma. 1997. “How Can Sub-Saharan Africa 
Attract More Private Capital Inflows?” Finance and Development 34(2).  
Bhinda, Nils, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jonathan Leape, and Matthew Martin. 1999. “Scale and 
Monitoring of Capital flows.” In Private Capital Flows to Africa, ed. Jan Joost Teunissen, 
19-46. The Hague: Forum on Debt and Development.  
Birdsall, Nancy, and Arvind Subramanian. 2007. “From World Bank to World Development 
Cooperative.” Essay, Center for Global Development. (http://www.cgdev.org).  
Boyce, James, and Léonce Ndikumana, 2001. “Is Africa a net creditor? New estimates of capital 
flight from severely indebted sub-Saharan African countries, 1970-96.” Journal of 
Development Studies 38(2): 27-56. 
Bradlow, Daniel D. 2006. “An Experiment in Creative Financing to Promote South African 
Reconciliation and Development”, American University Washington College of Law, 
Washington, DC.   
Broadman, Harry G., Godze Isik, Sonia Plaza, Xiao Ye, and Yutaka Yoshino. 2007. Africa’s Silk 
Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer. 1996. “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit 
Ratings.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review (October): 37-53. 
Chander, Anupam. 2001. “Diaspora Bonds.” New York University Law Review 76(4): 1005-99.  
Collier, Paul. 2006. “Is Aid Oil? An Analysis of Whether Africa Can Absorb More Aid.” World 
Development 34(9): 1482-97.  
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Catherine Pattillo. 2001. “Flight Capital as a Portfolio Choice.” 
World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 55-80. 
______. 2004. “Africa's Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions.” 
Journal of African Economies 13 (AERC Supplement 2): ii15-ii54. 
Dadush, Uri, Dipak Dasgupta, and Dilip Ratha. 2000. “The Role of Short-Term Debt in Recent 
Crises.” Finance and Development 37(4), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.  
Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man’s Burden. New York: Penguin Press. 
Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman. 2003. “New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting 
Aid, Policies, and Growth.” Working Paper 26, Center for Global Development, 
Washington, DC. 
  31Economist. 2007. “Africa and China: The Host with the Most.” May 17. 
Financial  Times. 2007a. “China Pledges US$20 Billion for Africa.” May 18.  
______. 2007b. “$5 Bn. S. African Bank Deal Signals China’s Ambition.” October 26. 
GAVI and World Bank. 2006. “Framework Document: Pilot AMC for Pneumococcal Vaccines.” 
Document prepared by the World Bank and GAVI for the second Donor Working Group 
meeting, London, November 9. 
(http://www.vaccineamc.org/files/Framework%20Pneumo%20AMC%20Pilot.pdf)    
Gelb, Alan, Vijaya Ramachandran and Ginger Turner. 2006. “Stimulating Growth and 
Investment in Africa: From Macro to Micro Reforms.” Paper prepared for AfDB-AERC 
Conference, Tunis, November 22-24. 
Gibson, John, David McKenzie and Halahingano Rohorua. 2006. “How Cost Elastic Are 
Remittances? Estimates from Tongan Migrants in New Zealand.” Working Papers 06/02, 
Department of Economics, University of Waikato. 
Goldstein, Andrea, Nicolas Pinaud, Helmut Reisen and Xiaobao Chen. 2006. The Rise of China 
and India: What's In it for Africa? Paris: OECD Development Center. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, and Eduardo Fernández-Arias. 2001. “Foreign Direct Investment: Good 
Cholesterol?” In Foreign Direct Investment Versus Other Flows to Latin America, ed. 
Jorge Braga de Macedo and Enrique V. Iglesias. Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Paris. 
 
Hermes, N., Lensink, R., Murinde, V. 2002. "Capital flight,policy uncertainty, and the instability 
of the International Financial System", in Handbook of International Banking, ed. 
Mullineux, A., and Murinde, V. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Hillman, David, Sony Kapoor, and Stephen Spratt. 2006. “Taking the Next Step: Implementing a 
Currency Transaction Development Levy.” Paper presented at Second Plenary Meeting 
of the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, Oslo. December.  
IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 2006. Global Monitoring 
Report 2006: Strengthening Mutual Accountability - Aid, Trade & Governance, 
Washington, DC: IBRD/World Bank. 
______. 2007. Global Monitoring Report 2007: Confronting the Challenges of Gender Equality 
and Fragile States, Washington, DC: IBRD/World Bank.  
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2006. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington, DC: IMF. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2007. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kasekende, Louis, and Ashok Bhundia. 2000. “Attracting Capital Inflows to Africa: Essential 
Elements of a Policy Package.” In Finance for Sustainable Development: Testing New 
Policy Approaches, ed. Juergen Holst, Donald Lee, and Eric Olson. New York: United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable 
Development.  
  32Kaul, Inge, and Katell Le Goulven. 2003. “Financing Global Public Goods: A New Frontier of 
Public Finance.” In Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, ed. Inge 
Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza. New York: Oxford 
University Press.   
Ketkar, Suhas, and Dilip Ratha. 2001. “Development Financing during a Crisis: Future-Flow 
Securitization.” Policy Research Working Paper 2582, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
______. 2005. “Recent Advances in Future-Flow Securitization.” The Financier.  
______. 2007. “Development Finance Via Diaspora Bonds Track Record and Potential.” Policy 
Research Working Paper 4311, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Matsukawa, Tomoko, and Odo Habeck. 2007. “Risk Mitigation Instruments for Infrastructure 
Financing and Recent Trends and Developments.” Trends and Policy Options 4. World 
Bank and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Washington, DC.  
McDonald, Calvin, Volker Treichel, and Hans Weisfeld. 2006. “Enticing Investors.” Finance 
and Development 43(4).   
Mora, Nada. 2006. “Sovereign Credit Ratings: Guilty beyond Reasonable Doubt?” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 30 (7): 2041-62. 
Ndikumana, Léonce, and James K. Boyce. 2002. “Public Debts and Private Assets: Explaining 
Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries.” Working Paper Series 32, 
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
Oxford Analytica. 2007. “Nigeria/China: Deal Will Help Extend Banks’ Reach.” October 31. 
Page, John and Sonia Plaza. 2006. “Migration, Remittances and Development: A Review of the 
Global Evidence.” Journal of African Economies 15(2):245-336.  
Powell, Andrew, Dilip Ratha, and Sanket Mohapatra. 2002. “Capital Inflows and Capital 
Outflows: Measurement, Determinants, Consequences.” Working Paper 7, Centro de 
Investigación en Finanzas, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Buenos Aires. August.   
Radelet, Steve. 2006. “A Primer on Aid Allocation.” Working Paper 92, Center forGlobal 
Development, Washington, DC. 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian. 2005. “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show?” Working Paper 05/127, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC. 
Ratha, Dilip. 2003. “Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External 
Development Finance.” In Global Development Finance 2006: Striving for Stability in 
Development Finance, World Bank, Washington, DC.  
______. 2006. “Leveraging Remittances for Capital Market Access.” Working Paper, 
Development Prospects Group, World Bank, Washington, DC.  
______. 2007. “Leveraging Remittances for Development.” Policy Brief, Migration Policy 
Institute, Washington, DC.  
  33Ratha, Dilip, Prabal De, and Sanket Mohapatra. 2007. “Shadow Sovereign Ratings for Unrated 
Developing Countries.” Policy Research Working Paper 4269, World Bank, Washington 
DC.  
Ratha, Dilip, and William Shaw. 2007. “South-South Migration and Remittances.” Working 
Paper 102, World Bank, Washington DC.  
Rutten, Lamon, and Okey Oramah. 2006. “Using Commoditized Revenue Flows to Leverage 
Access to International Finance; with a Special Focus on Migrant Remittances and 
Payment Flows.” Study prepared for the UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva.  
Salisu, Mohammed. 2005. “The Role of Capital Flight and Remittances in Current Account 
Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa.” African Development Review 17(3): 382-404.  
Skare, Mari. 2007. “General Remarks on Major Achievements.” Third Plenary Meeting of the 
Leading Group on Solidiary Levies, Seoul. September 3.  
Sundberg, Mark, and Alan Gelb. 2006. “Making Aid Work.” Finance and Development 43(4), 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.  
Sulla, Olga. 2007. “Philanthropic Foundations and their Role in International Development 
Assistance” International Finance Briefing Note No. 3, Development Prospects Group, 
World Bank.  
Technical Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms. 2004. Action against Hunger and 
Poverty. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/rapportdugroupequadripartite.pdf 
Trepelkov, Alexander. 2007. “Reflections on Innovative Financing for Development.” Paper 
presented at the Third Plenary Meeting of the Leading Group on Solidiary Levies, Seoul. 
September 3. 
United Nations. 2006. Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and 
the Global Water Crisis. New York: United Nations Development Program.  
United Nations Statistics Division. 1998. “Recommendations on Statistics of International 
Migration.” New York.   
Wang, Jian-Ye. 2007. “What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa?” Working Paper 07/211, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
World Bank. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Benefits from the first IDA Guarantee for Azito.” 
Project Finance and Guarantees Notes. Washington, DC: World Bank Private Sector and 
Infrastructure Vice-Presidency.  
______. 2002. Global Development Finance 2002: Financing the Poorest Countries. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
______. 2004. Global Development Finance 2004: Harnessing Cyclical Gains for Development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
______. 2005. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and 
Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
______. 2006. Global Development Finance 2006: The Development Potential of Surging 
Capital Flows. Washington, DC: World Bank.    
  34______ 2007a. Global Development Finance 2007: The Globalization of Corporate Finance in 
Developing Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank.    
______. 2007b. “HIPC At-A-Glance Guide.” Economic Policy and Debt Department brief, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. http://go.worldbank.org/85B908KVE0. 
______. 2007c. “World Bank Monthly Operational Summary Guarantee Operations.”  
http://go.worldbank.org/R5XXEKDS70. 
  35